The laundering of cultural goods has become such a widespread and insidious phenomenon that it should be a separate discipline unto itself, if only to resolve certain jurisdictional problems. Indeed, cultural goods are often subject to real or fictitious manipulations aimed either at removing or hiding their true origin and provenance or obscuring their illicit exportation to a foreign territory. Both of these actions usually constitute the crime of laundering.
Laundering has recently been sanctioned in many legal systems as a form of criminal conduct, and in the near future these sanctions may receive wider application with respect to cultural property. This application will also be of more practical use to combat the offense of handling (from which laundering most certainly derives), because in many legal systems, the knowledge of the criminal provenance of the received good is required in order to prove the offense of handling. Therefore, it follows that “to turn a blind eye” is not always sufficient to assert a defendant’s criminal responsibility, on the basis of the title of the offense of handling. On the other hand, in order to charge the offense of laundering, it is often sufficient that the defendant have “reasonable grounds to suspect” the illegal provenance of the goods, and that he/she strives to conceal this provenance. Thus, the mens rea (intent) of the offenses in question (handling and laundering) may be different; but the required intent is easier to demonstrate in cases that involve laundering.
Moreover, while in many legal systems the offense of handling can exist only if this crime has a specific crime as its base offense; on the contrary, laundering can be indicted insofar as it is proven that the provenance of the goods is illegal.
Laundering is a useful crime to prosecute, both because, at both a global and European level, many legal instruments such as the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (see list of states party) and the 1990 Strasbourg Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (see list of states party) offer a series of very strong powers, up to and including the confiscation of the property and/or profits. In addition, due to the exact definition of what constitutes the offense of laundering, the cases in which this offense is perpetrated will be more and more frequent in the future.
In particular, the U.N. Convention’s provisions may prove useful if they are applied to the laundering operations that exist in the antiquities trade. As observed, where cultural property is looted in a source State, stolen, illegally exported abroad or imported using some of the techniques that are described below: the cultural artifact may be defined as property which constitutes the proceeds of a crime, and the Convention requires States Party to establish criminal offenses that penalize the intentional transfer of ownership or concealment of origin of such property (Article 6). States Party are also required to establish measures to enable the seizure of such proceeds of crime, identify and trace property which may qualify as such proceeds (Article 12); respond to requests for confiscation by other State Parties (Article 13); and extradite suspected offenders (Article 16), even where the organized transnational character has not yet been completely established or the defendant has a marginal involvement into a criminal transnational organization. Moreover, according to this Convention, States Party should engage in the widest measures of mutual legal assistance (Article 18), consider conducting joint investigations (Article 19) and other measures of law enforcement cooperation (Article 27), and develop specialist training for law enforcement personnel (Article 29).
Laundering, as a crime, should occur not only in the light of monetary circumstances, but also when the nature and/or the provenance of a cultural object of illicit acquisition are altered
It now behooves me to underline that, according to a shared experience, antiquities are often chosen by criminals in order to launder the proceeds of their crimes. In fact, there is increasing evidence that drugs barons and other offenders are able to launder their money by taking advantage of the ethical and legal twilight in which the international illicit trade in antiquities operates.
Illicitly acquired cultural goods have even been used in a number of cases to obtain loans. When the loans are not repaid, the works of art end up in the vaults of the lending institution. Thus the objects are not only laundered; they lose their educational-cultural values as well.
In many cases, as Simon Mackenzie has observed, “the illicit market for antiquities operates hand in hand with a perfectly licit market. And traffickers in antiquities often find an established open and legal structure in market countries for selling those goods, which through chains of dealers and action houses operates very effectively to maximize the price which can be obtained for art and antiquities.” This is in sharp contrast with the illicit trade in drugs, where the products for sale and market structures are almost always tainted with illegality. In other words, in the illicit drug trade, there is no need for a process of obscuring the drugs’ country of origin and no need to transform the goods’ ownership history, because the goods themselves are illegal on the supply side, on the demand side, and at every point in between. The same is not necessarily true for the illicit traffic in antiquities, which is handled in ways that are similar to the weapons’ trade, where lawful structures and transactions may be used to clothe illegal dealing. Obviously, as the co-mingling between illicit and licit markets becomes more sophisticated and intertwined, the more difficult will be the investigations that are necessary to prosecute these crimes.
Laundering, as a crime, should occur not only in the light of monetary circumstances, but also when the nature and/or the provenance of a cultural object of illicit acquisition are altered. Let me explain this. Many of the triangulations by which cultural goods are physically transferred abroad (exclusively for the purpose of hiding their true provenance), should be re-examined and condemned in view of the issue under discussion. That is: Laundering. Generally, such triangulations are carried out for the purpose of hiding the illegal provenance and relocating the artistic objects to a foreign jurisdiction, especially where the norms are more permissive, thus permitting the eventual marketing and sale of these objects in markets that offer the highest profits.
In fact, cultural goods are often exported to those countries which have not ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (see list of states party). These countries are chosen precisely because, from that location, the goods can be transported again and resurface in States that have ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention, with the obvious advantage that the cultural goods will not be subject to the controls and limitations in force in cases of import-export between two countries which have both signed these agreements.
As Stefano Manacorda has suggested, a multi-national response must be implemented to prevent cultural goods in countries with a stringent export regime from being transported to more liberal regimes, where it is very easy to obtain the required licenses, with few formal checks in place.
Most countries, acting alone, cannot tackle all the triangulations. And according to the shared experience of those who have tackled this problem in recent years, it is pointless for market countries to impose restrictions if source countries and intermediary countries do not impose similar restrictions, because the market will simply shift from one location to another, and the problem will not be solved.
As Stefano Manacorda has suggested, a multi-national response must be implemented to prevent cultural goods in countries with a stringent export regime from being transported to more liberal regimes, where it is very easy to obtain the required licenses, with few formal checks in place.
As Neil Brodie has observed, “on occasion, the licensing system in nations such as the UK has been abused in a different way, when for instance exporters have submitted recently imported antiquities for Waverley judgment,” —in effect, submitting to a more stringent process, with the intention to acquire a false provenance (i.e., to locate the cultural items in Britain for more than 50 years).
In addition, these cultural goods are often illicitly exported to another country that is less interested in such items because of their different cultural significance. Indeed, in the importer country those cultural goods often don’t satisfy the artistic criteria as prescribed by its department of national heritage and the export licensing unit will not object to the granting of a license, which would not be granted by the country of provenance.
Obviously, all the licenses so obtained serve to bolster the provenance of cultural items that the criminals know full well to be of illegitimate exportation. In this respect, it has been stressed that government department concerned with export licenses or even tax concessions should check provenance of cultural goods which are submitted to them, therefore informing the country of origin whenever appropriate. While this does happen sometimes, this practice should be implemented internationally.
We must also point out that the laundering process adopted by criminals does not only include concealing or disguising the source, location or movement of cultural property. In fact, another particularly insidious form of conduct has unfortunately become widespread within this sector of criminality.
At times, illicitly excavated archeological objects, even when found intact, are deliberately fragmented, or, if found in fragments, are deliberately not restored. Such conduct, which might at first appear to be against the interests of those who commercialize archeological artifacts, is instead useful to criminals who operate in this field. The exportation is, in fact, easier, because a fragmented object can be hidden more easily; and in general, fragments do not attract attention at customs controls, because little value is attributed to them. Usually, customs officials are not experts and do not appreciate the importance of the artifact fragment, which can be underestimated even by experts.
Frequently the fragments are subdivided amongst the various participants of a criminal group. By so doing, the group achieves three results: They split the loot of the illicit activity, and they reinforce the ties that link the members of the conspiracy. On top of that, paradoxically, the criminal organization earns greater profits in economic terms, thereby creating a strong and often extortionist bond with the buyers.
Thus, the purchaser becomes part of a dangerous system of sales of fragments, mostly of vases. Generally the vases are of the highest quality and destined to be recomposed, in part or entirely, within a matter of years. This practice reveals a studied and intentional sales policy on the part of mediators and traffickers, who put only a part of the vase on the market, thus increasing the price of each new fragment that appears, making the piece more complete. At times they are used as promotion for other sales.
The purchase of these fragments, (in tomb-robber’s jargon, the so-called “orphans”) which are re-assembled to complete an object of which the principal part is already in someone’s possession, enables the seller to sell, and the purchaser to acquire, as much of the object as much possible.
In this scenario, the purchaser of such fragmented objects not only avoids suspicion, and resulting criticism that comes from acquiring an important object with an illicit provenance, the purchaser even appears to be meritorious, for contributing to the “rescue” of a cultural object that would otherwise be condemned to disappear. According to this often-repeated justification, such purchasers serve as “repositories of last resort”. But this scenario also involves risk. For one thing, when purchasing cultural artifacts in fragments, it is impossible to know the total price of the object until the final fragment that completes the piece changes hands, at which point the price may be very high indeed. And if the seller is apprehended and a fragment is discovered in the seller’s possession that matches other recently sold fragments, the buyer may be forced to return the still-incomplete item.
It is both obvious and significant that the purchasers of these fragmented objects are not immune to censure, since the acquisition of artifact fragments without clear provenance can only come from clandestine excavation. Indeed, the market for legitimate acquisitions offers artifacts that for the most part are complete, with accompanying certification and research.
A similar case of criminal conduct is that in which a stolen painting is cut up so as to create different and apparently distinct works of art. This happens when the dimensions of the painting are large, as for example, in the case of a triptych or an altarpiece. When the object is composed of several lots, it is easier to sell and produces greater profits. In addition, the different compositions thus created, become an obstacle for the research of the goods, precisely because it is not easy to compare the objects that finally reappear, with photographs of the originals. And it is even more difficult if, as is usually the case, the object has been touched up and restored, thus obscuring the illicit provenance of each portion (experts are at times helped in their investigative research by posture and orientation, in appearance, faces, etc. of the figures depicted, and thereby get an indication of the dismembering of the object).
Another expedient, used by criminals who operate in this field, is to touch up or otherwise disguise a cultural good over certain age and/or monetary limits, thus obscuring its national importance. In this situation, when the dishonest dealer applies for an export license, the export adviser for the export licensing unit does not object to the granting of a license, because he or she does not believe that the cultural good satisfies one or more of the artistic and/or economic criteria as prescribed by the exporter country or by its department of national heritage.
(Left) sculptured head of 18th Dynasty pharaoh Amenhotep III was dipped in clear plastic and painted to look like tourist souvenir (right) by Tokeley-Parry, and sold in 1993 for $1.2 million
In this regard, we can remember the Schultz’s case discussed before the Southern District Court of New York. The facts of this case are quite interesting. As Ildiko Pogany DeAngelis has noted, “Frederick Schultz, a New York dealer and president of an ancient art gallery, arranged to purchase smuggled antiquities from a British restorer by the name of Jonathan Tokeley-Parry who reportedly smuggled more than 3,000 antiquities out of Egypt during the early 1990’s. His method was to make the objects look like cheap reproductions by covering them in plastic and then applying gold leaf and black paint.”
After the cultural objects cleared British customs, Tokeley-Parry restored and sold them on the international art market with Schultz’s help. Furthermore, the Tokeley-Parry/Schultz team created fake documentation for the objects in order to have them as originating from an old collection, called the Thomas Alcock Collection, dating from the 1920’s. Labels for the collection were dipped in tea to give them an aged appearance, and Tokeley-Parry also restored some of the items using a method popular in the 1920’s.
These are the facts, and according to U.S. experts the Schultz’s case is important because after this case there seems to be little doubt that ignoring or dismissing patrimony laws of foreign country has to be deemed reckless and information about where and when the object originated, knowledge of the scope, effective dates and enforcement history of applicable foreign patrimony laws are no longer optional but necessary to avoid U.S. federal criminal liability.
In the civil context, the Schultz case has additional implications. According to a shared opinion, “title to undocumented antiquities can be subject to challenge by countries of origin in civil cases brought in the United States basing ownership on patrimony laws: The burden on a source country will be to prove ownership via the patrimony law and removal of the State owned object across its border after the ownership vesting statute was enacted. No proof of guilty knowledge of the law will be required.”, 
Thus, as assessed, countries of origin will now have ample incentive to quickly pass or amend and effectively enforce patrimony laws to ensure that they will be recognized by U.S. courts. In fact, as the Schultz case indicates, the U.S. Court will not consider foreign ownership laws to be enforceable if the laws are judged to be void due to vagueness, i.e. confusing, unclear and ineffective.
As Ildiko Pogany DeAngelis has observed, “source countries should be increasing their efforts to document antiquities within their borders, including those legally excavated, in private hands, and in public collections, so that every undocumented object removed after the enactment of the patrimony law may be identified by default to have been looted from an unexcavated site”. In addition, the problem of tracing cultural items to the modern day borders of a source country for civil restitution (generally speaking, it is not sufficient to say that they are State-owned because they come, for instance, from the Mediterranean area) can be successfully overcome, says DeAngelis, “if bordering countries agree to cooperate on such recovery efforts and seek return of objects as joint plaintiff.”
Summing up, in the Schultz case, the U.S. Court believes that, when necessary, their Courts can evaluate foreign patrimony laws to determine whether their language and enforcement indicate they are intended to assert true ownership of certain cultural property, and thus create a barrier to the importation of cultural goods owned by a foreign government: Because there is no reason that property stolen from a foreign country should be treated any differently from property stolen from a foreign museum or private home.
In other words, in the Schultz case the U.S. Court applied the same principles as established by Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1980) decision, which says “for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating State interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”. Obviously, the cultural heritage of a given nation involves contacts that are as strong and significant to the State of origin as required by this case law. Recently, these same principles have been asserted by the Supreme Court of Appeal of England and Wales in the case Republic of Iran v. Barakat Galleries Ltd.
Let’s take a moment to look at other types of laundering operations. One example involves the export of cultural goods, hiding their true context, by belonging to a collection. In many jurisdictions, the export licensing unit will deny a license, regardless of the importance of a particular item, if the artifact is presented as having a relationship with other goods.
Another type of laundering occurs when a cultural item is fictitiously exported in place of a similar object for which export license was obtained. This activity is especially common with respect to serial goods, such as coins or prints.
Other times, to bolster the legitimate provenance of a cultural item which the criminals know full well to be of illegitimate acquisition, the owner may request notification from data banks, such as IFAR (International Foundation for Art Research) in New York, or the ALR (Art Loss Register) in London, which document stolen works of art in their archives. Obviously, if an archaeological artifact is the fruit of clandestine excavations, the resulting research on its criminal provenance will be negative, since it can never have been registered as a stolen object. Even so, by obtaining an IFAR or ALR report, the dishonest dealer (including those who have been found to be in possession of photographs of the excavation), can always show his/her buyer the certificate. And should he/she be questioned, he will have the excuse and documents to sustain his good faith, since he/she had done all that was apparently “possible” to certify the licit provenance of the cultural object. In addition, the notification from data banks will report all the details given by the criminals and, as a result, the forged provenance of the artifact will appear to have been validated.
As Ildiko Pogany DeAngelis has observed, “source countries should be increasing their efforts to document antiquities within their borders, including those legally excavated, in private hands, and in public collections, so that every undocumented object removed after the enactment of the patrimony law may be identified by default to have been looted from an unexcavated site.”
Frequently, that same delinquency “introduces” a cultural good fictitiously into a private collection in order to confer upon it a legitimate provenance and thereby conceal its recent discovery in a clandestine excavation. This occurs especially with respect to serial goods (such as coins), or with collections that are not entirely documented. And one cannot forget that authentic artifacts can be substituted by fake ones, and that such collections can be quickly dismembered following the sale of the most valuable pieces. One should also not underestimate how large these collections can become during the very short time before the selling begins.
This form of laundering is the direct result of past museum policies. For instance, in 1996, shortly after the J. Paul Getty Museum passed a new policy, it acquired a large collection of more than 300 objects of Greek, Roman, and Etruscan origin from a private collector, and as Ildiko Pogany DeAngelis observed, “provenience for 90 percent of these objects was unknown. The documentation relied upon by the Getty was the museum’s own catalog from a loaned exhibition that it held a few years earlier.”
As assessed, critics (and a penal prosecution in Italy) accused the Getty of manufacturing documentation to satisfy its own requirements for provenance and thereby tacitly condoning the flow of illegal antiquities.
However, in the penal context to maintain that the cultural goods themselves come from that collection, whereas they in fact never belonged to that universitas, can in itself be considered and punished as an act of laundering.
Another safety measure that the dealer takes is that he/she loans the item to a museum, for a certain period of time. Once the loan period is over, the dealer can say that no claims have been raised by any third party during that time (the statute of limitation is usually very short because the item has been on public exhibition). This type of “ancient art laundering” was a successful practice among museums for many years, and criminals on purpose loaned the items in favour of less-known museums, before selling them to major museums.
To put an object up for auction for the purpose of selling it and repurchasing it through a front or through a company of convenience is a fictitious act, aimed exclusively at “laundering” the object – the primary objective- and thus attributing to it a value that is inherently false and arbitrary. Such conduct is particularly insidious, because it can alter the market value of an entire class of objects (values of individual objects are often uncertain and are often determined by comparison with other works of equal cultural interest), or because, for acquisitions made on the “overt market”, the so called time limit (that is, the time one has to take action to claim the object) is very short.
In this respect, it must be stressed that the most important auctioneers currently have due diligence programs in place that should minimize the risk of selling looted art. As Thomas Kline and L. Eden Burgess have observed, “Christie’s, Sotheby’s and Austria’s Dorotheum have adopted such procedures, at least formally. But these firms remain the exception in the art market. Many smaller houses and private dealers, lacking either interest or resources, have yet to implement such checks on provenance. How to close the ‘due diligence gap’ remains an important question for art market professionals, governments and others, since many cultural items are not of high value and thus do not necessarily move through Sotheby’s, Christie’s or other premier auctioneers or dealers.”
We must also stress that, at present, many of the codes of conduct concerning auction houses’ dealings require them to establish “to the best of their ability, that the objects they are dealing with or putting on sale are not stolen from excavations”. Obviously it is not possible to make good on this pledge: (a) when their sale catalogs provide no certain provenance, and only vague indications of ownership for many pieces; (b) when the items appear documented in Polaroids or other pictures depicting them just after excavation and, anyway, neither in scientific contexts nor referable to reputable collectors contexts; (c) when the same goods have never been ever studied, catalogued and inventoried by competent Authorities in their country of origin, which should be the case for objects discovered at authorized excavations, and (d) when their export has never been authorized by the Authorities of the country of origin (in this respect, the lack of suitable certification adds argument to their illicit trading).
Abiding by these codes of conduct, the dealers and/or auction house staff should be certain of the licit circulation and have no doubt about provenance: Indeed, according to their own ethical codes, these firms must have positive evidence of clear, genuine and licit provenance in order to vaunt good faith that is necessary to proper dealing. Yet this is frequently not taken into consideration by dealers and staff of many important and/or small auction’s houses. With proper international checks, the required information could be verified and “bad actors” prohibited and punished.
All the above leads us to conclude, without hesitation, that targeted regulation of the crime of laundering is indispensable, particularly when such criminal conduct trades in cultural goods, where laundering mechanisms and maneuvers are so numerous and the profit potential is so high, The establishment of an independent, international anti-laundering agency to monitor the art trade is a method that national and international law enforcement agencies would do well to consider.
Finally, as noted in the preparatory agenda proposing a model law for the protection cultural property to the UNIDROIT Governing Council, “many of the above mentioned laundering maneuvers and mechanisms take place thanks to the permeability of inter-state borders, to the greater fluidity of communications and to the emergence of new markets and purchasers.” In other words, among the many costs and benefits of globalization and trade liberalization, we should count the global trade in cultural goods, i.e., an issue of ever increasing proportion.
 For instance, the English legal system acknowledges the offense of handling only if the provisions of the Theft Act are infringed.
 Both laundering and handling require that a crime be committed before receiving the goods. But the base or predicate offense (i.e., the crime committed prior) can vary. For example, in order to commit the crime of handling, the goods must come from theft (predicate offense); but in order to commit the crime of laundering, the predicate or base offense can involve any one of variety of crimes. One thing that laundering and handling have in common: both crimes are committed only when a person deals with goods that are the proceeds of other crimes.
Often the cultural object is the profit of other crimes. In fact, they may, for instance, come from illegal excavation, clandestine exportation and so on.
 In this regard, many countries seem to punish every laundering manoeuvre.
 I have been investigating a case in which a statue of an Artemis was first exported from Italy towards Japan; then this same statue resurfaced in Switzerland where a very well-known dealer sent this archaeological item to the U.S. market. Asked to return the object, the Swiss dealer was so bold that he/she firstly surrendered a fake, but in the end he/she contributed to return the object.
 Up until recently, customary routes for Italian cultural goods have been Italy-Switzerland, Switzerland-London and London-U.S.-Japan-Australia or elsewhere.
 As in the past Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan.
 The red flag theory discussed in the Michael H. Steinardt case, before the U.S. Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. See the facts, procedural history and decision of the United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold 991 F. Supp. 222 of November 11, 1997; decision upheld and reasoning substantially affirmed (184 F. 3d 131 -2nd Cir. 1999) by U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The defendant in-rem in this case, the “antique platter of gold,” was a circa 400 BC libation bowl of Sicilian origin known as a phiale mesomphalos. In its decision, the U.S. Court stressed that concealment or misrepresentation is material if it has a natural tendency to influence or was capable of influencing the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed. In other words, “a false statement is material if it has the potential significantly to affect the integrity of operation of the importation process as a whole, and neither actual causation nor harm to the government need to be demonstrated. For a trier of fact to determine whether a statement can significantly affect the importation process, it need ask only whether a reasonable customs official would consider the statements to be significant to the exercise of his/her official duties”. For instance, the designation of Switzerland as the phiale’s country of origin and the listing of its value of $ 250,000 were objectively false and relevant.
 See “The Licensing of Archaeological Material for Export from the United Kingdom,” a memorandum submitted by Dr. Neil Brodie to the UK Parliament, 16 May 2000.
 A Waverley judgment is named after Viscount Waverley, who served as Chairman of a 1950 Committee that was appointed to consider and advise on export policy. As result of the Waverley Report published in 1952, two separate categories of material are recognised by the licensing system: Material which has been in the UK for over 50 years and material imported within that time. Thus, according to UK experts, a distinction is drawn between what is considered to be part of the national heritage (material in Britain for more than 50 years) and what is considered to be traded material (in Britain for less than 50 years). The operation of the licensing system pays great attention to the first category. Indeed, the system is designed specifically to protect the national heritage so that many objects will be reviewed individually. Vice versa, for the second category, the traded material, the requirements are less stringent and licenses are granted more or less automatically. A commentator has observed that the system functions to protect the heritage of the United Kingdom while at the same time allowing the British economy to benefit from marketing the heritage of others.
 During my investigations I also ascertained that criminals import into another country a fake work of art they want to pass as genuine. In these cases criminals are relying on the inexperience of the persons deputed to the checks, as their field of expertise is often only on national works of art.
 According to a shared experience, customs officers are estimated to lack professional training in art history, being often unable to identify an ancient artifact and, particularly, to indicate the limit of the legal age of artifacts, as compared to an obviously precarious artistic value. On the contrary, criminals are fully aware of the cultural good values in their possession, and during a search done in Paris in the apartment of a famous dealer I have found a fragment well wrapped in a little leather bag, purpose-built for this fragment.
 I and my experts have been able at tracing the criminal links of a conspiracy thanks to the documents collected, and through the fragments and their sub-division amongst the various participants.
 The main part or core of an archaeological good (the “mother”) is elsewhere and the fragments are orphans of it. In the past this jargon has been so common that during my investigation I had the chance to see that this same expression had been used in a letter written by a famous U.S. museum curator to a colleague of him/her. He/she claimed that, having firstly acquired a part of a kilix, he/she was the only one entitled to buy all the other orphans (fragments) that were about to appear on the market.
 Once, a curator of a museum said to me and I quote verbatim: “… It is true that I come to realize that we were blackmailed, I mean people knew they had a fragment, and that was an extremely unpleasant part”. However, the curator could have broken his or her ties with criminality denouncing the illicit affairs. In this regard, “… no effort should be spared to avoid giving in to ransom demands, so as to discourage the theft or illegal appropriation of movable cultural property carried out for that purpose. The persons or institutions concerned should consider ways and means of making this policy known” (see, the UNESCO Recommendation adopted in Paris on 28 November 1978).
 See, U.S. v. Frederick Schultz, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 333 F. 3d 393; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12834.
 However, the facts of this case are not unusual. In fact, I have recently ascertained that two paintings of a famous Maestro had been covered with a yellowish patina, in order to deceive the Officials for the Italian export licensing unit.
 Ildiko Pogany DeAngelis, ibid, pages 6 and 7.
 In Ratzlaf v. United States (510 U.S. 135, 149, 126 L. Ed. 2d 615, 114 S. Ct. 655, 1994) the U.S. Court relied on the venerable principle that ignorance of the law is no defence to a criminal charge.
 See, the case of Government of Peru v. Benjamin Johnson. In this case, as said, the Court suggested that Peru’s statutes could be interpreted to be export restrictions, not assertions of title.
 Ildiko Pogany DeAngelis, ibid, page 7
 As assessed by presiding U.S. district judge Jed S. Rakoff in his ruling of the Schultz’s case: “If an American conspired to steal the Liberty Bell and sell it to a foreign collector of artifacts, there is no question he could be prosecuted … the same is true when … a United States resident conspires to steal Egypt’s antiquities”.
 If a cultural good is presented at the export control hiding such a provenance (for instance, from a collection), and then this good is found in another country, there are some who do not see this object as being illicitly traded, and restrictions such as non-alienability or trust have often not been enforced in a foreign jurisdiction.
 Once, I seized some frescos and their photos which show two walls of a room pertaining to a rich Roman villa of the Vesuvian areas, of Pompei or Herculaneum, or of those sites which disappeared with the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 AD. According to the opinion of my experts, they were undoubtedly photographed during a phase of the clandestine dig. That we are looking at an illegal dig is obvious from an examination of the photos which show the conditions of the dig itself: The site of an archaeological excavation carried out by specialist technicians has very different characteristics from those shown in the photographs in question, in which the removal of the earth to free the frescoes is being conducted without any scientific criterion whatsoever, but instead with the one and only aim of being able to remove the paintings as quickly as possible. The photographs themselves also show beyond doubt that we are dealing with a room of a Vesuvian villa; the typology of the frescoes themselves is indisputably Campanian, but also because the pile of earth mixed with lapillae (clearly visible in the photos) is exclusively typical of the Vesuvian areas. Accordingly, the request to the Art Loss Register with regard to the frescoes in question was fictitiously submitted by the dealers; since these came from an illegal dig (circumstance of which all the players were well aware thanks to the photographs), they could never have been amongst listed stolen art works.
 Often museums, especially if one considers their past policies.
 As observed, at the end, the Getty Museum suffered not only a moral loss, but a financial one, even if the objects had not been totally purchased but partially donated, due to the costs expended to acquire, curate, conserve, and maintain objects in its collection.
 Universitas, meaning “a collection of goods.”
 As assessed, traders often try to take lower risks and they do not buy the item from the liaison dealer but they take it on consignment.
 During my investigations I have found a little page in the premises of a well-known dealer I searched. It reads: “The amphora we bought at auction is not ours!” (the word “ours” was underlined).
 The high market value of looted art can induce the criminality to do their “best” in order to excavate more and more archaeological items. In this regard, the museum curators have been the purchasers who often paid more, either because sometimes they split with dealers the illicit gain; or because they had to pay the silence of dishonest dealers; or because the laundering operations called more and more intermediaries into the affairs, thus increasing the prices.
 See “Item No. 9 on the agenda: Triennial Work Programme 2009-2011; Proposal for a Model Law on the Protection of Cultural Property (submitted by the Secretariat)” at the 88th session of the UNIDROIT Governing Council in Rome, 2-23 April 2009, page 6.